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 IMPROVING MONETARY POLICY MODELS
CHRISTOPHER A. SIMS
ABSTRACT. If macroeconomic models are to be useful in policy-making, where un-
certainty is pervasive, the models must be treated as probability models, whether
formally or informally. Use of explicit probability models allows us to learn sys-
tematically from past mistakes, to integrate model-based uncertainty with uncertain
subjective judgment, and to bind data-bassed forecasting together with theory-based
projection of policy effects. Yet in the last few decades policy models at central banks
have steadily shed any claims to being believable probability models of the data to
which they are ﬁt. Here we describe the current state of policy modeling, suggest
some reasons why we have reached this state, and assess some promising directions
for future progress.
I. WHY DO WE NEED PROBABILITY MODELS?
Fifty years ago most economists thought that Tinbergen’s original approach to
macro-modeling, which consisted of ﬁtting many equations by single-equation OLS
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and assembling them into a multiple-equation model, had been shown to be in-
ternally inconsistent and an inadequate basis for scientiﬁc progress in macroeco-
nomics.
1 The basic point, made at length by Haavelmo (1944), is that because in eco-
nomics our theories do not make exact predictions, they can never be proved inade-
quate simply by showing that they make prediction errors. In order to allow models
to be compared and improved, they must be formulated as probability models. That
is, they must characterize the probability distribution of observations, rather than
simply make point predictions. For macroeconomic models, this means they must
be probability models of the joint behavior of the time series they are meant to ex-
plain.
Ifweintendtousethemodelsindecision-makingwehavetogobeyondHaavelmo.
We have to recognize that the models have to be able to address sources of uncer-
tainty that the data are incapable of fully resolving. Large macroeconomic models
inevitably contain more free parameters and theoretical ambiguities than the avail-
able data can pin down for us. The model is not complete, for decision-making
purposes, unless it characterizes these sources of uncertainty. This means that at-
tempts to limit probability statements to areas of uncertainty where the frequentist
interpretation of probability is useful cannot be adequate. We need to think of our
probability models as characterizing uncertainty from all sources and as capable of
integrating uncertain information from sources other than the data — one aspect of
what is sometimes called “judgment”.
1These ﬁrst few paragraphs cover much the same ground as parts of Sims (2002); ?.IMPROVING MONETARY POLICY MODELS 3
While these points might seem obvious, the recent history of central bank macroe-
conomic modeling has seemed to ignore them entirely. The models that are in actual
use as frameworks for discussion in the policy-making process have abandoned the
theoretical framework of the Cowles foundation approach that Haavelmo’s ideas set
in motion. They have not replaced it with another probability-modeling framework,
but rather with a reincarnation of the single-equation ﬁtting approach of Tinbergen.
Thereisnoattempttoconstructajointlikelihoodfortheobservedtimeseries, andno
attempt to assess whether the model’s own structure can support the single-equation
methods used to estimate it. No model-generated measures of uncertainty play any
important role in policy discussions.
At a practical level, we need probability models in order to provide reliable mea-
sures of uncertainty about model results and projections, to allow us to compare
different models’ match to the historical data, and to allow us to learn systemati-
cally from our mistakes. This latter point has arisen repeatedly in the experience of
central bank modelers. There is a tendency to apply ad hoc repairs or extensions to
models, or to switch from one model to another as the focus for policy discussion, in
response to perceived mistakes. If we do not have a probability structure in which
to assess mistakes and proposed ﬁxes for them, there is a tendency to overcorrect,
to continually add degrees of freedom to the model so that overﬁtting bias grows
instead of shrinks as information accumulates.IMPROVING MONETARY POLICY MODELS 4
II. WHY HAVE WE ENDED UP WITH NON-PROBABILITY MODELS?
Here I take up a number of possible reasons for the retreat from probability mod-
eling at central banks.
II.1. The ossiﬁcation of academic econometrics. The Cowles foundation research
was based on frequentist asymptotic distribution theory and Neymann-Pearson sta-
tistical testing. It was developed at a time when models with more than 5 equations
were difﬁcult to handle computationally. Models at the scale needed for central bank
policy analysis have many more variables and free parameters. Frequentist asymp-
totic theory is an unreliable guide to the uncertainty associated with estimates of
models like these. Asymptotically efﬁcient methods, like full information maximum
likelihood, have exotic and difﬁcult to compute frequentist small sample properties.
Instrumental variables methods, if all apparently eligible instruments are used, of-
ten reduce to OLS or something very close to it. The frequentist asymptotic theory
had nothing to say about how or why to limit lists of instruments, though there
were many ad hoc practical suggestions as to how to do so. The Cowles foundation
theory, in short, prescribed methods that were difﬁcult to implement and provided
distribution theory that was an unreliable guide to the uncertainty associated with
the results.
This situation might have been a challenge to academic researchers, leading to de-
velopment of new and more appropriate methods. But as the models were reaching
their full scale, academic researchers became convinced by a simpliﬁed version of
the Lucas critique that was taken to imply that econometrics-guided real time policyIMPROVING MONETARY POLICY MODELS 5
analysis was internally contradictory or of trivial importance. Academic research on
the econometrics of large scale policy models almost ceased.
Another reason for the lack of attention to the problems of inference in large time
series models was the long detour of econometric time series theory into unit root
and cointegration theory. The basic insight of this theory, that cointegration is pos-
sible and that differencing every nonstationary series leads to loss of information,
is important. But from the perspective of likelihood-based inference (as opposed to
Neymann-Pearson testing), this is all there is to it. There is no need for preliminary
identiﬁcation of unit root counts and cointegration vectors in order to allow correct
inference. Frequentist approaches to inference, however, lead to prescriptions for
complicated sequential testing procedures whose small sample properties, in large
models, are poorly approximated by the asymptotic distribution theory that nomi-
nally justiﬁes them. So not only was there a great deal of intellectual effort expended
on theory that is of little relevance to modeling for decision-making, the complexity
of this theory, and the impracticality of actually applying it to models of the scale
needed for central bank policy, probably inhibited bank research staff from trying
to do the multiple-equation econometrics right. Very few were trained in Bayesian
inference, which avoids these obstacles.
Of course these things are changing. The number of economists who are famil-
iar with Bayesian reasoning and methods, while still not large, is certainly grow-
ing rapidly. Changes in computing technology and associated developments in
algorithms and programs have made it practical to cope with probability modelsIMPROVING MONETARY POLICY MODELS 6
that would have been out of the question even 10 or 15 years ago. And chairman
Greenspan’s characterization of modern monetary policy as roughly an application
of Bayesian decision theory has helped to make all this respectable in central banks.
II.2. Fear of being Lucas-critiqued. There is no reason that incorporating rational
expectations need entail retreating from probability-based inference. Indeed one
branch of the early rational expectations literature took it as a program for devel-
oping improved multi-equation macro models, incorporating new “cross-equation
restrictions” that would make estimates sharper. But the branch of the literature that
read the Lucas critique as implying econometrics-based policy analysis was trivial or
delusional took the steam out of the cross-equations restrictions program. Also, im-
plementing the program required staff with a new kind of technical training, which
became available only slowly. Minnesota, where I was in the 70’s and 80’s, was a
centerofresearchandtraininginrationalexpectations. Paradoxically, theBlanchard-
Kahn approach to solving rational expectations models, which is the foundation of
the solution methods for large models, was not a standard part of the curriculum at
Minnesota. Students instead became expert at reducing models to one-dimensional
equations and at using guess-and-verify methods of solution that are impractical on
large systems.
With new Ph.D.’s all expert at criticizing any model in which expectations were
not rational, yet increasingly sketchy in their understanding of multiple-equation
probability modeling, it is natural that attention turned mainly to generating modelsIMPROVING MONETARY POLICY MODELS 7
that incorporated rational expectations, even if this forced, because of the limitations
on staff research time, retreat from probability-based inference.
Within the last few months I have heard a prominent economist repeat, in a pre-
sentation, the canard that economists have nothing useful to say about quarter-to-
quarter monetary policy settings, and that in any case these questions are not impor-
tant. His view was that the only kind of advice we have to give is analysis of policy
“rules” — and that inﬂation-targeting is not a rule. I think this point of view is not
as widely accepted as it used to be, but it is still common enough to be a source of
worry about the decay of this obstacle.
Though I have explained often before (2002; 1987) the internal inconsistency of
this view that the only correct or nontrivial form of policy choice is choice of policy
“rule”, and people seem to ﬁnd the point either obvious or incomprehensible, let me
explain it. The extreme view of the fallacy runs like this:
The economy can be thought of as a multivariate stochastic process,
every period generating new realizations of the vector of random vari-
ables that characterizes the state of the economy. One part of the sys-
tem that determines the behavior of this stochastic process is the be-
havior of the central bank. The bank’s behavior can be thought of as
described by an equation that maps the current state of the economy
into a probability distribution determining monetary policy actions
next period. So long as this mapping remains the same, the stochastic
process characterizing the behavior of the economy is the same. WhatIMPROVING MONETARY POLICY MODELS 8
the central bank normally does on a month-to-month or quarter-to-
quarter basis is simply to choose particular values for the monetary
policy random variable. To be more concrete, if the policy rule is a
“Taylor rule” mapping past inﬂation and past output growth into cur-
rent Federal Funds Rate values, what the policy authority does is pick
values for the residual in the Taylor rule. Doing this does not change
the rule itself and thus has no effect on the stochastic process being
followed by the economy.
But changing the rule — changing the coefﬁcients in the Taylor rule
or replacing the Taylor rule with a policy of setting the rate of growth
of reserves, for example — would change the stochastic process fol-
lowed by the economy. It is only this kind of policy action that has
nontrivialeffectsand onlythis kind aboutwhich economists haveany-
thing important to say.
The problem with this view is that it does not recognize that changing the coef-
ﬁcients in the policy rule or adopting a money growth target is a policy action like
any other, in the sense that, from the point of view of a rational private agent, it is
an uncertain event. Changes in “rule” are then just one more source of random dis-
turbance in the stochastic process the economy follows. Changing the rule does not
change the stochastic process itself, it just picks a particular realized value for the
“change in rule” random variable.IMPROVING MONETARY POLICY MODELS 9
Of course the Lucas critique did teach us that the effects of policy actions depend
on the beliefs of the private sector about the distribution of policy actions. It matters
whether the public believes that when inﬂation starts rising this implies that soon
the Federal Funds rate will start rising. It matters whether the public believes that
when the Funds rate rises, this signals a likely continuing sequence of further rises,
or instead that such rises are temporary. But the same considerations apply to policy
rules. Does the public believe that a rule that makes interest react sluggishly to inﬂa-
tion will be maintained if inﬂation accelerates? Does the public believe that a shift to
a stronger and quicker reaction of the Funds rate to inﬂation will be maintained in a
period where energy price rises produce simultaneous inﬂation and recession?
A conventional approach to policy evaluation recently has been to build a model
in which expectations are modeled explicitly. Policy changes are then modeled as
changes in the policy sector of the model (usually a single “reaction function”), with
private sector expectations treated as based on knowledge of this new policy behav-
ior, at the date it is introduced, no knowledge of it before the date it is introduced,
and ﬁrm belief that the new behavior will be indeﬁnitely sustained, Such analysis is
said to avoid the Lucas critique. But in fact it is precisely a replication of the type of
policy analysis that Lucas critiqued. It models a policy action (the change in rule) as
if it were non-stochastic from the point of view of the public, ignoring private sector
expectations about the action before and after it occurred.
The fact is, we must think of every policy action as stochastic. If this is true, there
is no possibility of taking policy actions that change the stochastic process followedIMPROVING MONETARY POLICY MODELS 10
by the economy. But this does not mean that policy actions have no important con-
sequences. Stochastic processes do not have to be stationary. Random disturbances,
including policy actions, can change the conditional distribution of future paths of
the economy in ways that make permanent, important changes in the levels of vari-
ables.
While nihilistic views about quantitative policy advice seem to be dwindling only
slowly, inﬂation targeting tends to go hand in hand with more explicit attention
to regularly repeated economic projections and with an expanded role for model-
ing. The policy cycle in central banks is precisely quarter-to-quarter monetary policy
making, and to those engaged in it it appears, correctly, neither easy nor unimpor-
tant. This tends to keep things moving in the right direction.
II.3. Preventingmisbehavioroflongtermprojections. Datainherentlycannothave
muchto sayabouta model’sdynamicsatwavelengths ofaquarter thesamplesizeor
longer, but projections this far, or nearly this far, into the future are not uncommon in
policy scenarios. Models ﬁt by standard invariant methods — in other words, with-
out using prior distributions — will tend to misbehave when asked to make long
projections. This tendency becomes worse if system methods have not been used in
estimationandifcontinualadhocrespeciﬁcationofindividualequationshasintensi-
ﬁed overﬁtting. Central bank modelers understandably have looked for ways to get
improved long run behavior. Probably beginning with the Bank of Canada’s QPM,
they have turned toward creating a “core” that has reasonable long run behavior im-
posed and that is deliberately insulated from inﬂuence by the data. My impressionIMPROVING MONETARY POLICY MODELS 11
is that the appeal of stabilizing the model’s long run behavior, the Bank of Canada’s
demonstration that the “insulated core” approach worked, and the absence of any
established alternative within a framework of frequentist, probability-based, multi-
ple equation modeling, has been a major reason for retreat from such frameworks.
But it is clearly not a good thing in principle to be insulating long run properties
of models from the data. Particularly in fully articulated behavioral models, the data
will be informative about low frequency properties. The initial promise of the real
business cycle framework included the idea that we could integrate the study of
growth and business cycle ﬂuctuations in a single model.
Estimated DSGE’s still suffer from these difﬁculties. It is common in estimating
these models to preprocess data to remove low frequency variation, either by sim-
ply removing means and/or trends, or by differencing, so that the likelihood itself
is insulated from low frequency variation. This is done because our usual stable of
models does not include any that provide ﬂexible enough low frequency behavior
to match observed means and growth rates, while at the same time producing real-
istic cyclical behavior. For example the actual data show drift in hours per worker,
investment as a share of GDP, trade shares in GDP, etc. Our standard setups that
deliver homogeneously growing steady states cannot easily match these facts. The
paper Edge, Kiley, and Laforte (2005) at this conference is a start at confronting these
issues.
Structural VAR’s are capable of matching complex low frequency behavior. Their
problem is that they are too ﬂexible in this dimension, and that ﬁtting to data doesn’tIMPROVING MONETARY POLICY MODELS 12
automatically make a VAR’s low frequency behavior emerge as reasonable. The gen-
eralized dummy observation methodology discussed below provides a promising
approach to addressing this problem.
II.4. The need to decentralize and collaborate. In every central bank, preparing
projections in the policy cycle involves groups of people with different types of ex-
pertise trading information and iteratively adjusting the projections as they commu-
nicate. The equation-by-equation approach to model speciﬁcation and estimation is
convenient for these purposes. Subgroups of staff can be put in charge of particu-
lar equations or groups of equations, while projections from the assembled model
maintain consistency as the groups make adjustments.
Structural VAR’s attempt to make minimal identifying assumptions, and accord-
ingly almost always leave large blocks of equations uninterpreted. Equation-by-
equation ﬁddling with the model is therefore harder to justify. While in some ways
this is an advantage, it is certainly a disadvantage in trying to decentralize work on
the model..
DSGE’s with a rich set of structural shocks and no measurement error do have
distinct sectors, but if they are formulated as joint probability models, there is no
simple way to estimate the sectors in isolation. Such models should be perfectly
usable as a framework for communication and decentralization in the policy cycle.
Adjustment of guesses about the likely size of current structural disturbances would
be the focus of discussion. They are not amenable to decentralized estimation, but
so long as full system estimation is feasible, that is probably a plus.IMPROVING MONETARY POLICY MODELS 13
II.5. The need to incorporate judgment. In models that have unstable long run be-
havior, judgment is sometimes invoked to set the projections back on track. More
commonly, judgment inﬂuences projections by bringing in expert knowledge of cur-
rent information that does not show up in the model’s data series. Though the need
for levers that allow introduction of judgment is sometimes cited as a reason for
using the type of model that is now most prevalent, this kind of judgmental adjust-
ment can be implemented more easily and consistently with models estimated with
modern Bayesian methods. The judgmental information is naturally characterized
as beliefs, with speciﬁed precision, that can be combined with the posterior pdf that
emerges from the sample.
III. ACTUAL BIG MODELS IN HEAVY USE
Here I discuss FRBUS, the model in use at the US Federal Reserve Board, and
BEQM, the model in use at the Bank of England. They are both subject to many
of the same criticisms, but they are different in important ways. Looking at their
structures in more detail may help us to understand why models in actual use end
up not being probability models.
The BEQM core has been more consistent in applying modern macroeconomic
theory than was FRBUS. Some of the criticisms I made earlier (2002) of FRBUS —
that it introduces expectations in an ad hoc, equation-by-equation way that has no
substantial foundation in theory and that its treatment of government debt and the
effects of inﬂation on it doesn’t even properly reﬂect budget constraints — do not
apply to the BEQM’s core. In FRBUS, changes in the real value of government debtIMPROVING MONETARY POLICY MODELS 14
induced by inﬂation or interest rate changes unanticipated at the time of the issuance
of the debt do not affect household wealth. These effects are of crucial importance in
analyzingtherisksofsustaineddeﬂationorofsuddenchangesinexchangeratesand
interest rates that might arise in a shift of foreign appetite for US debt. In an earlier
paper (2001) I pointed out that wealth swings from these sources are substantial. A
recent paper by Doepke and Schneider (2004) has shown that potential gains to the
US public from a surprise burst of inﬂation are at historically unprecedented high
levels. Central bank models that cannot trace these effects could prove deﬁcient at a
time when monetary policy becomes particularly difﬁcult.
BEQM has such wealth effects accounted for properly. On the other hand, it also
considers only one-period government debt, so the only route for such effects is via
inﬂation unanticipated one period in advance. At least in US historical experience,
wealth effects on holders of longer term debt from unanticipated changes in interest
rates are as important.
But BEQM is not just the core. It includes “non-core” equations whose interpreta-
tion was still not clear to me after having read through the 200+ page book (Harrison,
Nikolov, Quinn, Ramsay, Scott, and Thomas, 2005) describing the model. These non-
core equations are in some sense estimated from data. As in FRBUS, the estimation
is equation-by-equation, but the core, whose parameters are insulated from the esti-
mation, is used in the estimation process. The relation of core to non-core seems to
be different in out-of-sample projections from what it is in the estimation. The paper
by Alvarez-Lois, Harrison, Piscitelli, and Scott (2005) for this conference lays out anIMPROVING MONETARY POLICY MODELS 15
internally consistent linearized version of the model that matches my initial intuitive
interpretation of it: the core is treated as an unobservable component.
























































































This is a linear system with two observable vectors, yt and zt, and one unobserv-
able, y∗
t. It could be estimated and simulated forward for forecasting by use of the
Kalman ﬁlter. In the paper on BEQM in this volume, a small model in this format is
used for forecasting and some of its parameters are estimated using this approach.
Proceeding this way recognizes that we can never know y∗
t exactly, even at dates in
the past. The approach implies a measure of ﬁt and a way to compare this model
to others in terms of match to the data. If the parameters of the core model, which
enter the system matrices nonlinearly, are ﬁxed at calibrated values, the degree of
mismatch to the data this imposes could be assessed by estimating, as a standard of
comparison for model ﬁt, the model with the elements of the A,B,..., N matrices
unconstrained.
But there is no indication in the BEQM book that the model is ever dealt with
in this internally consistent way. The descriptions in the book of estimation and
forecasting procedures contain ambiguitites, and appear not to be justiﬁable by any
probability model, The core/non-core (CNC) exercises in the conference paper are
with a 4-observable-variable model, and though the paper estimates three modelsIMPROVING MONETARY POLICY MODELS 16
on similar data series, no comparisons of ﬁt among the models, or to less restrictive
reduced form models, are carried out. It is a promising new development that BOE
researchers are formulating an internally consistent probability model that they see
as embodying their core/non-core approach, and I hope we can look forward to this
approach being applied to the full BEQM model and used to evaluate ﬁt.
As with any setup that introduces a gap between observed data and those that en-
ter the behavioral equations of agents, the CNC framework implies serious problems
in making policy projections. How does one explain to the policy board a situation
where actual GDP or consumption moves in the opposite direction from core val-
ues of these variables? How does one decide whether judgmental information from
experts about the current value of a variable should apply to y∗ or to y? It appears
to me from the BEQM book that there is even a distinction between core and non-
core versions of the interest rate that enters the policy reaction function. When the
model is used to condition on a particular path for the policy rate, what is set, the
core rate or the non-core rate? The usual interpretation, that changes in the policy
rate are shocks to the reaction function, can’t apply here, as the speciﬁcation implies
that there is no inﬂuence of non-core shocks on core variables, while the core model
reaction function contains no shocks. It seems likely that projections of policy effects
are made by dropping the core reaction function from the system and replacing it
with a ﬁxed time path for the rate or with an alternative reaction function. What are
policy makers to do with projections in which the core policy rate and the actual rateIMPROVING MONETARY POLICY MODELS 17
follow different paths? This type of question seems to me a serious drawback for
such models as vehicles for communication.
FRBUS, though never formally considered by the FRB as a joint probability model
for the time series to which it is ﬁt, could be so treated. One can imagine estimating
FRBUS as a big Bayesian slightly nonlinear autoregressive model. This is true be-
cause the model can be thought of as a mapping from time t and earlier data to time
t residuals. The methods now in use to ﬁt BEQM do not generate residuals in such
a model-consistent way. FRBUS has a little VAR that runs alongside it, providing
in-sample forecasts for the historical ﬁt and used for out-of-sample expectations in
the most common form of scenario simulation. This VAR’s properties provide an
implicit check on FRBUS, as well as helping to keep its projections on track in the
short run. There is no such companion to BEQM. BEQM has an “exogenous vari-
ables model” to generate the predictions of exogenous variables that it uses in both
in and out of sample projections, but this is not a VAR, or even a single model.
FRBUS also uses the core/non-core idea, but in FRBUS the core is primarily a
set of cointegrating relations among variables that are estimated and imposed as if
non-stochastic. Here the justiﬁcation for insulating the core from data, or at least
from data-based measures of uncertainty, is the asymptotic theory that predicts that
cointegrating relations can be estimated with 1/T rate precision.
IV. BAYESIAN DSGE MODELS
Since the pioneering work of Smets and Wouters (2003) there has been interest
at many central banks in producing models that are at the same time believableIMPROVING MONETARY POLICY MODELS 18
probability models of the data and interpretable models of macroeconomic behavior.
Because they are probability models, they have the advantages we have discussed
above: they can provide usable characterizations of uncertainty about policy pro-
jections; they allow us to learn systematically from experience without overﬁtting;
they allow us systematically to compare the ﬁt of different models; and they gen-
erate the post-sample probability distributions that are needed for decision-making.
Of course all these advantages also characterize Bayesian structural VAR’s. The dif-
ference is that the new Bayesian DSGE’s provide more complete stories about how
policy actions produce effects on the economy and about where non-policy distur-
bances to the economy originate.
While these models are extremely promising, there are several problem that in-
hibit there rapid adoption by policy-making institutions and create skepticism about
them among economists. In some cases the problems are misperceptions. Some
economists complain that the models have “too many shocks”. Because the data are
clearly not singular, any model that ﬁts multiple time series must necessarily have
at least as many sources of stochastic disturbance as there are variables being ex-
plained. It is possible, as in CNC style models, to separate shocks into economically
interpretable ones (like technology shocks) and “measurement error”, with the lat-
ter treated as not part of the behavioral model. This of course does not reduce the
shock count. In my view, shocks labeled measurement error in economics seldom
believably have the properties attributed to them — lack of correlation with other
variables and irrelevance to prediction of future values of variables in the system.IMPROVING MONETARY POLICY MODELS 19
There is of course often a wide gap between the concepts in our theoretical models
and the actual accounting rules that produce our time series.data. But these concep-
tual gaps do not have the usual statistical properties of measurement error. There
is no “true” model of the economy in which there is a single representative agent, a
single good usable for consumption and investment, etc.. Our observed data are not
generated by mistakes in measuring the variables in such a true model. The theo-
retical models we use are themselves crude approximations to a richer reality. The
“measurement error” is for the most part in the models, not the data. If this is the
actual situation, proceeding as if in fact the observed data were observations on the
variables in the theoretical model, contaminated by random measurement error, can
lead to very misleading results.
There are some cases, particularly in monthly data, where estimates of sampling
error in macro data based on surveys are available. Often sampling methods gen-
erate known dynamics in the sampling error because of sample rotation. In cases
where the sampling error is a substantial component of prediction error, we should
be modeling it explicitly, and we do too little of this. But such cases are relatively
rare. Artiﬁcially introducing measurement error as a way to pad out a theoretical
model so it is no longer singular is a mistake. The Smets and Wouters approach, in
which disturbances are for the most part economically interpretable changes in pa-
rameters describing behavior, seems a better starting point. It is not hard to believe
that actual economies are subject to disturbances of many types, from many sources,
and in fact results from these models bear this out. Business cycles are explained, inIMPROVING MONETARY POLICY MODELS 20
the ﬁtted models, by disturbances from many sources. We do not ﬁnd the model ﬁts
best with two or three dominant sources of disturbance.
So the “too many shocks” criticism of the Smets-Wouters approach does not seem
to me justiﬁed. A related criticism is the “too many adjustment costs” criticism. To
ﬁt the data well, Smets and Wouters needed to incorporate in their model many
sources of inertia that other researchers had suggested and investigated. It is not
hard to believe that the actual economy has many sources of inertia. The difﬁculty is
rather that there seem to be in principle many choices available as ways to model in-
ertia, that the different approaches may have different policy implications, and that
neither the data nor economic common sense gives us much basis for choosing how
to model inertia. Inertia from adjustment costs is likely to imply much higher costs
of ﬂuctuations than inertia from information-processing delays, for example. Our
uncertainty about sources of inertia is a good reason to take the policy implications
of such models with a grain of salt, especially when the models are used to gener-
ate conclusions about optimal policy based on expected utility of the representative
agent or agents.
However, the appropriate response to worries about sensitivity of results to inertia
assumptions is not to use models with fewer sources of inertia that (therefore) ﬁt
poorly. The appropriate response is to develop an array of models, or one model
with an array of options for modeling inertia, that let us explore the extent to which
the data can or cannot pin down the nature and source of inertia.IMPROVING MONETARY POLICY MODELS 21
The methods used by Smets and Wouters to estimate their models and assess their
ﬁt are relatively new to economics. Their properties when applied to models at the
Smets-Wouters scale and higher remain incompletely tested. The Markov Chain
Monte Carlo method they use is iterative, and while it is guaranteed to converge
(under some regularity conditions), there is no foolproof way to assess its conver-
gence. Applications of these methods in econometrics and ﬁnance have in some
cases paid too little attention to assessing convergence. These issues are particularly
difﬁcult when the methods are used to compare models. Models with any element
of simultaneity, which will include most economic DSGE models, are likely to have
zeroes at isolated places in the likelihood, and this makes for difﬁculties in assessing
posterior probabilities on models (Sims, Waggoner, and Zha, 2005). The appeal of
these methods is that they allow us to estimate models and assess their ﬁt, while
no other approach can do so in an internally consistent way. Nonetheless we will re-
quire more experience with these methods before they can be a routine part of policy
modeling.
DSGE models do not easily match the ﬁt of structural VAR’s. The ﬁrst Smets-
Wouters paper showed their model apparently slightly surpassing the ﬁt of Bayesian
VAR’s, but this was in the context of their having preprocessed the data to remove
means and trends, which tilted the results in favor of their DSGE. Efforts to compare
ﬁts of DSGE’s and structural VAR’s that pay careful attention to convergence and do
not treat detrended data as if it were unprocessed have often found that the DSGE’sIMPROVING MONETARY POLICY MODELS 22
are rather far from the structural VAR’s in ﬁt. This should not be a permanent prob-
lem. There is no reason in principle that DSGE’s with ﬂexible structural dynamics
should not eventually ﬁt as well as BVAR’s, but for the time being BVAR’s have an
important role to play as a standard of ﬁt.
Finally, in our enthusiasm for having “story-telling” structural models that actu-
ally ﬁt the data, we need to bear in mind that the stories these models tell are false.
There is no aggregate capital stock, there is no composite consumption good, not
everyone continuously dynamically optimizes, there is no one-dimensional index of
technology, and there is no permanent steady-state growth path to which we are cer-
tain to converge. These are just a few of the important falsehoods DSGE models are
generally based on. This does not mean that story-telling models are not useful; but
even when they ﬁt just as well as structural VAR’s or similar models that minimize
detailed assumptions and thereby forego easy story-telling, we will want to have the
less restricted models around as checks on the stories we are telling.
V. CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS
Though the remarks above are mostly critical, policy-modeling is likely to be mak-
ing substantial progress in the near future. The Bayesian Monte Carlo methods
whose practicality was demonstrated by Smets and Wouters are likely to be used
widely. I hope and expect that the methods will be applied, especially by academic
macroeconomists, to models of varying types — with different choices about aggre-
gation, different modeling of sources of inertia, different levels of detail in modeling
ﬁnancial markets, for example. The Smets and Wouters example ought to lead notIMPROVING MONETARY POLICY MODELS 23
to a convergence toward one type of model, but to a proliferation of models that ﬁt
well, allowing us to compare theoretical approaches with a new level of discipline
from the data.
As I noted above, story-telling models will continue to make detailed assumptions
that are known to be only approximate. There will therefore continue to be a role for
weakly structured models, like Bayesian structural VAR’s (SVAR’s). Those models
can themselves be made more useful by better incorporating economists’ beliefs in
the long run stability of the economy, so that projections from SVAR’s do not eas-
ily produce implausibly wide error bands or explosive long run central forecasts.
One recent and widely cited approach to accomplishing this is that of DelNegro and
Schorfheide (2004), who use a story-telling type of DSGE model to generate a prior
on the coefﬁcients of an SVAR model. It is also possible to take a more straightfor-
ward approach, if the aim is simply to induce more stable long run behavior. One
can weight the likelihood to penalize unreasonable long run behavior, and this can
be given a consistent interpretation as implementing a Bayesian prior. The basic idea
is explained in notes available at sims.princeton.edu/yftp/DummyObs. There
are technical difﬁculties in interpreting results obtained with such penalties when
models are being compared, but the difﬁculties are manageable.
Ideally, model comparison and combining of model results can be carried out in a
consistent Bayesian framework, using odds ratios on models. This requires, though,
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of ﬁtting the data well. As matters stand now, many or most models contain con-
ventional, ad hoc simplifying assumptions to make them manageable. They have
not been brought to the point of ﬁtting well, but we have in mind that with a lot of
additional work it might be possible to do so. If Bayesian odds ratio methods are
applied to a collection of such models, they will tend to put heavy weight on the
best-ﬁtting model, even though the differences in ﬁt among the models largely re-
ﬂect ad hoc simpliﬁcation that do not seem substantively important. This is not to
say that the odds ratios calculations should not be done. Models that ﬁt well are pos-
sible, and we will discover how to construct them only by assessing ﬁt, even when
the assessment brings discouraging news. There seems to be reason to hope that
within a decade or so we will ﬁnd it normal that competing models all ﬁt well. But
in a situation like the present one at most policy institutions, when we are comparing
substantively different models whose ﬁt differs for reasons we expect arise from ad
hoc simpliﬁcations, not the substantive differences, we cannot mechanically apply
odds ratios to assess model uncertainty.
Since we are likely to continue for some time, or perhaps indeﬁnitely, to use multi-
ple models, and for the time being they may not ﬁt well, we need to consider how to
compare them and to combine or choose from the results they give us. One approach
would be to let structural VAR’s play the role of “base model” in the framework of
Schorfheide (2000). Schorfheide discusses the situation where one would like to use
a model or models that are known not to be correct because the base model ﬁts bet-
ter. His conclusion is that in this case the choice of model and the characterizationIMPROVING MONETARY POLICY MODELS 25
of uncertainty about the results should involve evaluating the model in use based
on the probability distribution implied by the base model. In practice, a rough way
to implement this would be to check that projections from the workhorse model lie
within VAR-based error bands. Of course this requires that the type of projection be-
ing made is valid within the base model. Evaluating the effects of a range of possible
choices for a monetary policy path would then require a structural VAR in which
the monetary policy equation or block is correctly identiﬁed. The reason for using
the workhorse model instead, if it did not conﬂict too sharply with the VAR, would
be the more detailed story it provides about the causal chain connecting monetary
policy to other variables in the system. If we eventually progress to the point where
the large, main, policy model is a Bayesian DSGE, that model might play the role of
base model, while smaller models that can be more quickly manipulated for making
projections in real time, play the role of the less-well-ﬁtting alternatives.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is a little discouraging that the biggest recent model reform, BEQM, which was
worked on in part after the Smets and Wouters proof of concept, represents possi-
bly the most complete turning away from probability-based inference of any large
central bank model. On the other hand, there is apparently interest at the Bank of
England in attempting a probability-based approach to BEQM or a variant of it, and
there is active research toward building probability-based models at many central
banks and other policy institutions. Developments in computational power and inIMPROVING MONETARY POLICY MODELS 26
statistical and economic theory seem to be coming together to promise a period of
rapid progress in policy modeling.
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